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Reporting on Palin: Negotiations in Political Theater
By Erin Ryan
(published October 2nd, 2008 at http://www.hnlr.org/online/?p=17)
Ever since Sarah Palin’s selection as John McCain’s vice presidential running mate, the McCain
campaign has engaged in a cut-throat, high-stakes negotiation with a uniquely hamstrung
counterpart—the news media. Or at least, that’s how it would appear to a skilled negotiator,
given the unmistakable hard bargaining tactics the campaign has regularly employed. Extreme
demands, psychological warfare, bluffing, stonewalling—each day yields another expert
recitation of classic bargaining tactics that you might expect to encounter while shopping for a
used car, though not so much in an election that should epitomize our civic ideal of consensusbuilding in the marketplace of ideas. But here we-the-people are, stuck on the seamy sidelines of
a used car lot, watching the campaign and the press throw down.
It’s not your standard wheeling and dealing, to be sure, but it’s a negotiation nonetheless. What
are they bargaining over? Like all negotiations, it’s about what the parties want from one
another. The press wants a good story, of course, within the bounds of maintaining public
credibility. The campaign wants favorable press coverage for its candidates, hoping to generate
public credibility of its own. So it has been since campaigning began. But in this election, the
McCain campaign has perfected a slowly developing twist in the game, pursuing a new
bargaining strategy with ruthless message discipline at the expense of credibility for all involved.
The campaign would still like favorable press coverage for its vice presidential candidate, of
course, but if it can’t have that, its secondary aspiration is to undercut the legitimacy of what
unfavorable coverage it receives—and with it, the legitimacy of the news media in general. Since
Palin’s debut, the campaign has chased this second goal with even greater vigor than the first,
leaving us to wonder whether it is not the second-best thing at all, but what the campaign really
wanted to begin with. (Witness the artistically orchestrated spectacle during the convention, in
which the speakers rallied tens of thousands of delegates to boo the members of the media
among them covering the event for the tens of millions of viewers watching it all happen on live
TV.)
It’s easy to forget that the Republicans are actually campaigning against the Democrats, given
that their most barbed attacks have been directed at the news media. Like the notorious hardbargainer most fear facing on the other end of a deal, the campaign has baited the press with
personal attacks (accusing reporters of bias and discrimination), trumped up phony issues
(insisting that covering Palin’s family was sexist even after Palin had made her family role a
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centerpiece of her campaign), and land-mined Palin’s speeches with demonstrably phony facts
(such as hailing Palin as a fiscal reformist despite facts indicating that she supported the Alaskan
“Bridge to Nowhere” until it became a political embarrassment).
But the campaign’s most successfully exploited trick is the time-honored tactic of “anchoring”
the bargaining range at the very outset of the negotiation. The cut-throat bargainer starts with an
extreme demand strategically far removed from the true value at stake in the deal. You’re selling
a used car worth $1000? You offer it for $5000 and see how the other side responds. You’re
looking to buy the same used car? You offer $250 and wait. The other side will counter, but the
psychological pull of that extreme opening figure is hard for most to resist, and they usually
respond closer to your opening than they had planned. Even if they counter reasonably, research
predicts that after a standard negotiating concession pattern, the deal will close near the midpoint
between the two opening offers. Start with an extreme demand, and you can often define where
the rest of the negotiation takes place based on nothing more than the self-serving “anchor” you
dropped in that fateful opening move.
This is what the McCain campaign did in the first few moments of Palin’s candidacy, when it
staked out an extreme position in negotiating for the kind of coverage it wanted for the
nomination. In response to critical comments posted on a liberal blog about the Governor and her
teenage daughter’s apparent pregnancy (and despite the distinction between a liberal blogger and
the mainstream press), the campaign withdrew Palin from press access and lambasted the news
media in general as liberally-biased, sexist, and cruel. It accused reporters of unfairly targeting
Palin’s family, record, and experience. Campaign Manager Rick Davis announced that Palin
would not be available for interviews until the press was prepared to show the proper “respect
and deference” that she was due (Fox News Sunday, 9/7/07). To the lay observer, it was an
unprecedented expectation in a presidential campaign; to the hard-bargainer, it was an cunning
“precondition demand.” And in stalling Palin’s first interview until several weeks had passed
(and moderating the tone of those few that have followed), it worked.
In seizing the initiative this way, the campaign expertly accomplished three hard-bargaining
objectives in one opening “offer.” First, it successfully anchored the negotiation over Palin’s
coverage in a range that limited the options of the press to a few unattractive alternatives. With
Palin unavailable for interviews, the press could either conduct background research of the sort
the campaign would further decry, or cease coverage until she was made available to answer
questions. No coverage seemed like an irresponsible option after a relative unknown was
nominated for the heartbeat-away position—the second-most powerful job in the world and the
presumptive heir of a McCain presidency a few terms down the road (or sooner). But doing
almost anything else would set the stage for further accusations by the campaign, which the press
would be unable to refute without providing yet more fodder for the trumped-up controversy. If
competitive bargaining is an information game, the campaign adroitly arranged to have all the
information, for as long as possible.
After the campaign’s aggressive opening, the press would have had the next move, but lo—in
withdrawing Palin from public reach, the campaign stonewalled, and therein deployed its second
tactical bargaining tool: the scarcity effect. A powerful way to influence the perceived balance of
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leverage in a negotiation is to create the illusion that what you have to offer is a scarce
commodity, driving up the (apparent) value of the deal. When the desired asset seems scarce, a
negotiator falling prey to this cognitive bias overestimates the value of what the other side has to
offer and devalues her own alternatives. Introducing Sarah Palin as a scarce resource made her
seem that much more intriguing, that much more appealing, and that much more tantalizing a
news item.
Finally, accusing reporters of political and sexual discrimination (not to mention heartless cruelty
to a mother and her young children) denigrated them as individuals and weakened their footing.
A hard-bargainer uses personal attacks to unbalance an opponent, psychologically inducing him
to devalue the strength of his own negotiating position. By leaving shaken up reporters nothing
to cover other than the controversy itself, the campaign decimated what leverage would have
been left to the press, all in the first move.
Said controversy succeeded in firing up the Republican base, but in context, the campaign’s
posture of outrage suggests more bargaining strategy than genuine indignation. However delicate
the issues of how to cover a candidate’s teenage daughter’s unwed pregnancy, its treatment by
the press was unlikely motivated by the alleged liberal bias. Anne Kornblut aptly demonstrated
this in her Washington Post thought-experiment a week into the nomination (9/7/08), in which
she asked how things might have been different had similar facts become known about Hillary
Clinton during her campaign for the Democratic nomination. Would the press have given her an
easier ride? Would Republicans have closed ranks to protect her honor and dignity from a media
frenzy? (If you can find someone who believes it so, please let me know—I have a used car I’d
like to sell!) Meanwhile, sheltering Palin from questioning reporters gave the campaign needed
time to bring her up to speed on issues of national import with which she has little prior
experience or knowledge. (As Richard Shell observed in Bargaining for Advantage, a shrewd
bargainer always has two reasons for a proposal: a good one, and the real one.)
Should the media leave candidates’ families alone, categorically? Probably—though it’s harder
to make that claim when a candidate opens the door by promising to make her family values
yours as a matter of law. Would press coverage of either Clinton or Palin in this situation reveal
sexist attitudes? Certainly—though the campaign’s complaints to this effect rang hollow after
McCain had earlier approved a supporter’s pet name for Hillary Clinton that rhymed with
“witch,” and after Palin had called Clinton a “whiner” for objecting to sexist coverage of her
own campaign. But was the media’s scrutiny of Palin’s experience, ethics, dubious stump-speech
claims, and even her daughter’s pregnancy the result of liberal media bias? No; that was just the
press doing its job, in a manner at least as well or as poorly as usual. But now, the press was put
on the defensive, and with seemingly few means of self-defense. For the press is uniquely
hamstrung in the bargaining venue of political theater.
In ordinary negotiations against hard bargainers, theorists advise a series of de-escalation
techniques to defang these tricky tactics. When they make knowingly false statements, you
counter by insisting they back up their claims with objective criteria and standards—though in
this context, finding them is a job for, well, the press. When they stonewall or deploy pressure
tactics to browbeat compliance, you subject the tactics to public scrutiny by taking the story to—
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yup, the press. When they apply psychological warfare, attacking your intelligence, ability, or
good faith, a technique advocated by Roger Fisher and William Ury in Getting to Yes is to
disarm them by being simultaneously “soft on the person and hard on the merits,” showing them
personal support while holding firm on the merits of the conflict. They will attempt to relieve the
cognitive dissonance this creates by disassociating from their bargaining position, opening up
better avenues for collaborative resolution. Or, you can simply call them out on the tactic, hoping
to extinguish its force under the powerful light of day.
But in a situation like this, the press can’t be soft on the person or hard on the merits. It can’t
cozy up to the campaign without compromising the very neutrality on which it is premised, and
it can’t simply respond to the campaign’s accusations. For one thing, the press is not supposed to
respond, or to even have counter-positions of the sort a negotiation like this requires. It’s just
supposed to report the news—to narrate the stories as spun out by the subjects of reporting, and
not to become the subject of the news story itself. But even if the press could respond to defend
itself, doing so would play directly into the campaign’s strategy, fortifying the public image of
adversity that the campaign has been projecting. The campaign’s claim, in essence, is that the
press is against the campaign. If the press defends against this, then it really is fighting with the
campaign, reifying the very claim it seeks to refute. So much easier to just be gentler in covering
the Palin story, extinguishing the campaign’s entire grievance… (Score for the campaign.)
What should the press do instead? Perhaps negotiation theory offers good counsel after all,
notwithstanding the special challenges faced by the press. When the campaign makes dubious
factual statements, such as Palin’s stump-speech refrain that she told Congress “thanks, but no
thanks for that Bridge to Nowhere,” the press should hold it to the objective criteria revealed by
solid reporting, and pair coverage of the speech with an account of those facts. When the
campaign alleges media bias, the press should report on the controversy together with objective
criteria that refutes or supports the claim. The press may not be “soft on the person and hard on
the merits” as Fisher and Ury envisioned it, but it can report on the legitimate subjects of news
while showing the respect for candidates that accords good journalistic ethics. If this does not
create cognitive dissonance for the campaign strategists, perhaps it will do so in the minds of the
third parties who really matter in this negotiation—the public who can then make decisions for
themselves about which side seems most credible. In the end, this is the only negotiating
outcome of import.
Some in the press have begun to heed this advice, rejecting the 20th century conceit of the
invisible reporter to self-identify as needed to respond to out-of-bounds moves at the 21st century
bargaining table of political theater. The danger, of course, is that too much self-reference will
erode the credibility of the news media as a neutral party in the ongoing negotiation over the
demands of public accountability in a political campaign. We don’t want a world in which the
need for self-defense tips the balance of neutrality that most news providers already struggle to
provide. Part of the responsibility for preventing that lies with campaigns and the candidates who
approve their questionable tactics, and of course, with the public that elects candidates who
handle this responsibility badly.
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In the meanwhile, we-the-people remain on the sidelines, watching the Great Negotiation of
2008 play out with ever queasier stomachs. Both sides of the political aisle are doubtlessly guilty
of questionable tactics at various times, and neither are they the exclusive province of political
campaigns. (For example, did Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson really expect Congress to sign
off on that no-oversight $700 billion blank check, or was that just an anchoring tool to focus
legislators’ efforts on securing oversight rather than rejecting the intrinsic proposal?) Still, the
McCain-Palin campaign’s aggressive strategy has moved beyond the threshold of peer political
theater, and transgressed the boundaries of good faith. It does so at the expense of public
credibility in the press that would keep government itself honest, and at the expense of the
marketplace of ideas in which our presidential elections are decided. Without a functioning free
press, there is no open marketplace of ideas. Make no mistake; the stakes of this negotiation are
high. And for the public, so far it’s been looking like a very bad deal.
–Professor Ryan teaches negotiation at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of
William & Mary.
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